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A number of papers .nd that changes in schooling are not correlated with changes in per capita 
income. Two non-competing interpretations that have been given are that the social return on 
schooling is close to zero and the measurement error of changes in schooling is high. This 
paper shows that the lack of significance of schooling is threefold. First, there is a problem of 
a  proper  definition  of  the  way  in  which  years  of  schooling  should  enter  in  a  production 
function.  Second,  collinearity  between  physical  and  human  capital  stocks  seriously 
undermines  the  ability  of  educational  indicators  to  display  any  significance  in  panel  data 
estimates. And third, failure to cope with measurement error and endogeneity produces biased 
estimates.  As  opposed  to  the  earlier  empirical  literature,  the  social  return  of  schooling  is 
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Introduction 
 
A recurrent question that has characterised the debate on economic growth during the last 
decade refers to the puzzling lack of correlation between years of schooling and income per capita 
in empircal research. This evidence has led to different examinations and reinterpretations of the 
role of education. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) have put forward that the level of education should 
not be seen as a factor of production, but as a determinant of changes in total factor productivity. 
Also,  in  subsequent  versions  of  an  influential  paper,  Pritchett  (2001)  has  argued  that  the  poor 
institutional framework, low quality and excess supply of schooling in developing countries are all 
responsible for the lack of empirical link between changes in educational attainment and economic 
growth.  Cross-country  evidence  reported  by  Temple  (2001)  supports  the  Pritchett  hypothesis. 
Paralleling these results a series of panel data studies have also failed to .nd signi.cance of schooling 
in standard growth regressions (Bond et al 2001; Caselli et al 1996; Islam 1995). 
The purpose of this paper is to try to reconcile the macro evidence with the micro findings 
on the returns to schooling. The paper argues that, although the Pritchett hypothesis may apply to 
some  speci.c  countries,  it  cannot  explain  the  null  or  even  negative  coefficients  for  years  of 
schooling. The causes of these findings must be found somewherelse. 
This is not a paper about why changes in the schooling variable cannot explain per capita 
income growth between 1960 and a later date, as first noted by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). This 
has already been addressed by Krueger and Lindahl (2001) who single out measurement error in 
years of schooling as the central cause behind this finding. Instead, the focus here is on how, given 
the estimation problems found in the literature, to compute reliable estimates on the social return on 
schooling. 
There are basically three issues that have to be considered. First, there is a problem of a 
proper definition of the way in which years of schooling should enter in a production function. The 
subjacent question is how to relate the number of years of schooling to human capital. Put simply, 
this is a discussion on whether the macro return to education should be evaluated in a log-log or 
log-linear formulation. This question can be settled empirically and has already been addressed 
elsewhere (Bils and Klenow, 2000). A second issue refers to the appropriate functional form to be 
estimated.  As  is  shown  later,  a  simple  statistical  problem  of  collinearity  between  physical  and 
human  capital  stocks,  a  point  surprisingly  neglected  in  the  earlier  literature,  may  be  seriously 
undermining educational indicators.ability to display any significance in estimation in levels. The 
third point refers to the consistency of the estimates. Empirical research has usually relied on OLS 
or  fixed-effect  estimation  and  therefore  has  overlooked  endogeneity  and  measurement  error 
problems. This omission has certainly led to inconsistent estimates. 
As  many  authors  have  noted,  the  discussion  on  why  education  fails  to  display  positive 
effects in growth regressions is more an academic issue than one pertinent for policy decisions. The 
policy relevant question is whether schooling presents social returns that are higher than the private 
ones,  which  could  provide  empirical  support  for  orienting  decisions  on  public  spending  in 
education. The paper offers a range of values for the social return to years of schooling. It will be 
seen that social returns exceed the standard private returns found in micro studies only if physical 
capital is assumed to respond to changes in human capital. Assuming return homogeneity the full 
sample estimate of the income response to one additional year of schooling is around 8:0%. This is 
in the range of micro-Mincerian returns reported by Psacharopulos (1994) and Psacharopulos and 
Patrinos (2002) for country-level studies. 
However,  there  seems  to  be  substantial  heterogeneity  in  the  macro-Mincer  coefficients 
across countries. Two main results emerge from the data. First, the macro Mincer coefficients bear 
no relationship with micro coefficients reported by Psacharopoulos. In particular, schooling has no 
significant effect on aggregate income for the group of countries with the highest micro Mincer 
coefficients. And second, schooling has no significant effect on income in the group of countries 
with lowest quality levels. International Conference on Human and Economic Resources, Izmir, 2006 
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The bottom line of these new results is twofold: contrary to the earlier findings, the social 
return to education displays positive and statistically significant values but these values are not 
higher than the private returns. Therefore no Lucas (1998) type externalites are observed in the data. 
The paper is organised as follows: the next section discusses the most influential results and 
the current state of the literature on the macro-returns to schooling. Section 3 highligths the diffi- 
culties in estimating this return and presents new empirical results. Section 4 explores the effects of 
return heterogeneity across countries and considers alternative de.nitions of human capital. The 




The empirical literature on macro returns to education has two broad sets of studies. The 
first, based on endogenous growth models, suggests that the level of education affects the income 
growth rate, as in Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). In these models the level of human capital is not 
characterised as an input of the production function, but as a determinant of domestic innovation 
and of absorption capacity of foreign technologies. Benhabib and Spiegel show that in a growth 
regression the change in years of schooling, whether measured by Kyriacou (1991) or Barro and 
Lee (1993), provides non-significant and sometimes even negative coefficients. On the other hand, 
they find that the level of schooling is positively -though not always significantly correlated with 
growth. Undoubtedly, these results are the first to have questioned empirically the view that human 
capital is to be treated as an additional factor of production. 
Informal growth regressions à la Barro, which are closer to the neoclassical frame work 
since they imply the existence of a steady state in income level, also postulate a growth-on-level 
formulation. In these regressions the educational level is sometimes seen as a state variable, i.e. a 
variable measuring the proximity to the steady state (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995) and sometimes 
as a determinant of the steady-state itself (Barro, 1997). 
The second tradition is based on the neoclassical model .revived. by Mankiw, Romer and 
Weil (MRW, 1992)
1. In this tradition, human capital is represented as a factor of production in an 
extended version of the Solow model as follows: 
 
Here Y represents total output, K and H are total physical and human capital respectively, 
and L is the labour force. From equation (1) and standard laws of motion for K and H, MRW show 
that both, the output level and growth may be related to the investment rate in physical and human 
capital.  These  two  equations  represent,  respectively,  the  steady  state  and  convergence  path  of 
income. Then, in their empirical analysis, MRW show that human capital investment is signi.cant in 
both equations. For human capital investment MRW use the secondary enrollment rate multiplied 
by the fraction of population aged 15 to 19 in the working age population. 
The empirical results of this in.uential paper are nevertheless shadowed by the fact that 
MRW fail to control for the endogeneity of the investment rates and by the murkiness of their 
measure  of  human  capital  investment.  Examples  of  papers  that  have  tackled  the  endogeneity 
problem for testing the MRW model are Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996) and Islam (1995). In 
both papers the schooling variable appears with the wrong sign. 
The availability of data on both physical and human capital stocks has made possible the 
direct estimation of level-on-level or change-on-change regressions. Pritchett (2001) follows this 




1 Endogenous growth models a la Lucas (1988) also see human capital as an input of the production function. Human Resources 
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where h is human capital per worker, r is the return to education (which Pritchett sets at 0.1) and S 
is the average number of years of schooling from Barro and Lee (1993). He then uses OLS and IV 
methods to estimate the following cross-section regression, 
 
where  for each country i and  stands for the growth rate of variable g, over 
the period 1960-1985. As in Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Pritchett finds a non-significant  , 
implying that changes in schooling have had no impact on economic growth. Furthermore, when the 
income level   is regressed on the level of physical and human capital, the significance of   is also 
rejected.  The  interpretation  of  this  result  is  however  radically  different  from  the  one  given  by 
Benhabib  and  Spiegel.  Pritchett  highlights  the  institutional  characteristics  where  increases  in 
education have taken place and argues that: i) the education provided has low quality and so it has 
not  generated  increases  in  human  capital;  ii)  the  expansion  in  supply  of  educated  labour  has 
surpassed demand, leading to a decrease in the return of education; and iii) educated workers may 
have gone to privately lucrative but socially unproductive activities. 
However, even if all these phenomena may be actually taking place, they can hardly be the 
reason behind the apparent lack of productivity of education in macro empirical studies. First, it is 
di¢ cult to believe that the provision of education has been of such a low quality in some countries 
that on average the world return is zero. Moreover, as shown later, if countries with higher levels of 
schooling  bene.t  from  better  quality  and  productivity  of  schooling,  then  standard  methods  of 
estimation would provide world average returns biased upwards, not downwards. Second, even 
assuming that the supply of education has increased more rapidly than demand, this cannot by itself 
imply  that  one  additional  year  of  schooling  leads  to  a  null  increase  in  production.  Besides,  in 
Pritchett.s argument is implicit the idea that shifts in demand or supply would alter a technical 
parameter, which is a rather unconventional assumption. And third, the hypothesis that most of the 
increases in education have been devoted to socially unproductive activities around the world -
which would be necessary to explain a null global return- is simply at odds with reality: we do 
observe that more educated people are employed in better-remunerated activities, which themselves 
are registered in the national account systems. Again, this simple observation does not mean that all 
skilled workers are devoted to socially productive activities, but the opposite is not true either.  
More recently, Temple (2001) has revisited Pritchett.s results. He has explored the effects of 
estimating the MRW production function (1) by assuming different formulations for human capital. 




where f(Si) is a function of the number of years of schooling. In particular, Temple reports results 
for  f(Si)  =  rSi  and  for  .  None  of  these  yielded  significant 
coefficients at standard levels. Temple concludes that .[. . . ] the aggregate evidence on education 
and growth, for large sample of countries, continues to be clouded with uncertainty.. 
The  systematic  failure  of  cross-country  regressions  to  display  positive  effects  from 
education has led to some researchers to question about the quality of the data on education. Topel 
(1999) and Krueger and Lindahl (2001) argue that measurement error in the number of years of 
schooling is a major cause of the apparent lack of significance of  in growth regressions. In both 
papers the authors report panel data results for the following equation for country i in year t: 
 
where  represents a time-specific effect. The years of schooling variable is from Barro and Lee 
(1993),  which  according  to  Krueger  and  Lindahl,  has  less  measurement  error  than  Kyriacou.s 
(1991) data. Topel and Krueger and Lindahl estimate (5) by using different data frequencies. They 
find  that  in  high  frequency  regressions  (i.e.  panel  data  with  5-year  observations)    is  not International Conference on Human and Economic Resources, Izmir, 2006 
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significant,  while  in  lower  frequency  regressions  (10  or  20-year  observations),  becomes 
significant. The authors argue that in short periods of time   has a low informational content 
relative to the measurement error and this is why in 5-year data regressions the significance of   
is rejected. But in longer periods of time true changes in S are more likely to predominate over 
measurement errors. Furthermore, Krueger and Lindahl show that if the estimate of   (in the 
regressions  with  20-year  observations)  is  adjusted  by  taking  into  account  the  downwards  bias 
induced by the measurement error in S, its magnitude shoots from 0.18 to 0.30. Topel finds a non-
adjusted  as high as 0.25 in a similar regression. These values suggest huge returns to education, 
and if taken at face value, they would imply large positive externalities. 
Yet,  these  findings  must  be  looked  at  with  some  caution  for  three  reasons.  First,  the 
regressions  are  not  based  on  a  speci.c  growth  model.  The  use  of  lagged  income  suggests  that 
equation (5) represents a convergence path towards steady state. But in that case it is hard to justify 
the  presence  of  both,  the  change  and  the  level  of  schooling  simultaneously.  Recall  that 
MRWaugmented  model  states  that  in  a  convergence  path,  income  growth  depends  on  the 
investment rate of human capital (not on its level or change). 
Second, in almost  all the regressions  reported, the endogeneity of  years of schooling is 
completely neglected. This variable is likely to be endogenous since richer countries may afford 
more spending in education, hence a higher level of education. Not dealing with the endogeneity of 
S means that its coefficient is likely to be biased upwards.The few regressions reported by Krueger 
and Lindahl that were estimated with instrumental variables methods make use of Kyriacou.s series 
as instruments (as a solution to the measurement error problem). However, this instrument does not 
represent a solution to endogeneity since it is itself an endogenous variable. Krueger and Lindahl 
argue that the attenuation bias introduced by measurement error is higher than the upwards bias 
inherent to the endogeneity of S. But this argument, by itself, does not justify not using suitable 
instruments -like lagged values of endogenous variables to overcome the measurement error or 
endogeneity problems. A straightforward estimation method that deals with both sorts of biases 
looks as a much more natural method of estimation. 
A third reason to be cautious about these results is that   is significant only when the 
change in the stock of physical capital is omitted from the regressions. When Krueger and Lindahl 
include   loses its explanatory power, while physical capital growth gets a coefficient 
as high as 0.8. This is much higher than the standard share of physical capital in total income -
which is thought to have a ceiling at around 0.5 (see Gollin, 2002)- and consequently is a clear sign 
of endogeneity problems. Only when the coefficient associated to   is constrained to 0.35, 
 recovers its significance. Krueger and Lindahl conclude that: .Overall, unless measurement 
error  problems  in  schooling  are  overcome,  we  doubt  that  cross-country  growth  equations  that 
control for capital growth will be very informative insofar as the bene.t of education is concerned. 
To  illustrate  the  effects  entailed  in  the  omission  of  physical  capital  consider  Table  1. 
Columns (1) and (2) reproduces the estimates of equation (5) reported by Krueger and Lindahl 
(2001) and Topel (1999) for the regressions based on 10-year observations (over the period 1960-
1990). Series for GDP per capita and per worker are fromWorld Penn Table Mark 5.6 and years of 
schooling are from Barro and Lee (1993). These results show that both, the change and the initial 
level of years of schooling have a positive effect on economic growth. The differences in point 
estimates are due to the different methods of estimation. Krueger and Lindahl.s results are obtained 
by OLS, while Topel uses the Within estimator, hence the large downward bias of lagged income. 
From these results the authors conclude that schooling has an effect on growth. Columns (3) and (4) 
replicate these regressions by using Cohen and Soto (2001) series on years of schooling, for 83 Human Resources 
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countries.
2 The results are very close to those of Krueger and Lindahl, whether GDP per capita or 
per  worker  is  used.However,  when  the  change  in  capital  stock  is  included
3  in  column  (5)  the 
coefficient on the change in years of schooling falls dramatically and becomes insignificant. The 
further inclusion of the initial level of physical capital stock causes the initial level of schooling to 
lose its significance as well. On the other hand, the large coefficient on physical capital reflects that 
endogeneity is biasing upwards this coefficient. Yet, endogeneity of physical capital by itself may 
not be the cause behind the vanishing effect of schooling. Moreover, if countries invest more on 




Krueger and Lindahl argue that measurement error in S is exacerbated by the inclusion of 
physical  capital,  hence  the  lack  of  significance  of  schooling  in  the  regression  with    
However,  the  next  section  shows  that  even  the  estimation  in  levels  .which  is  less  subject  to 
measurement  error  problems.produces  non-significant  coefficients  for  years  of  schooling. 
Therefore, something in addition to measurement error is affecting the estimation of the social 
return to schooling, unless Pritchett was right in his assessment about the fact that education has not 
promoted economic growth in the last decades.  
The  paper  shows  that  rather  than  a  consequence  of  measurement  error,  the  lack  of 
significance of years of schooling is the comovement of physical capital and years of schooling. 
This hypothesis is explored below, in the framework of a standard production function. 
 
 
2 The complete Cohen and Soto (2001) database on years of schooling and educational attainment is available at: 
ttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/13/2669521.xls 
3 Physical capital stocks are from Easterly-Levine (2001). International Conference on Human and Economic Resources, Izmir, 2006 
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Rediscovering Education 
 
The previous section highlights the difficulties that the earlier literature has found when 
trying  to  estimate  the  social  return  on  schooling  from  equations  in  first  differences.  A  natural 
solution in order to gauge this return is to run regressions in levels or a combination of levels and 
first-differences. Assuming constant returns on K and H, and setting ln h = rS
4, equation (1) yields 
the following testable system of equations: 
 
where   and  are respectively country and time specific effects, and   is a residual. 
The assumption of constant returns on K and H   allows the identi.cation of r and 
has no implication on the results that are presented below. Indeed, the social Mincerian return is the 
semi-elasticity of income with respect to years of schooling. And this can be estimated without any 
prior knowledge about factor shares in total income. 
Table  2  reports  estimates  for    and    resulting  from  different  methods  of 
estimation. The first column shows the OLS estimates for the equation in levels (6). The physical 
capital variable is highly significant and its estimated share in total income is 0:60, larger than the 
conventional  wisdom.about  this  variable.  Conversely,  years  of  schooling  do  not  turn  out  to  be 
signi.cant. Column 2 shows the results for the equation in differences (7), which are similar to those 
obtained for the equation in levels. Namely, years of schooling are not significant, as earlier cross-
country growth regressions have already found
5 . As for the GMM estimates, none of them results 
in a significant coefficient for years of schooling
6. The estimation in levels (regression 3), which 
uses lagged first-differences of the regressors as instruments, produces qualitatively simalr results to 
the OLS estimates. What is more, the standard Arellano-Bond estimator (column 4) provides a 
negative  coefficient  -although  not  significant-  for  and  an  excessively  high    Blundell  and 
Bond (1998) and Blundell, Bond and Wind meijer (2000) have shown that in finite samples the 
difference  GMM  estimator  have  a  large  bias  and  low  precision  when  the  series  have  a  strong 
autoregressive component. This is certainly the case of the physical and human capital series. When 
the variables are strongly autoregressive the authors show that the system GMM estimator, which 
estimates  simultaneously  the  equation  in  levels  and  in  first  differences,  provides  more  precise 
estimates  and  lower  biases  in  finite  samples.  Yet,  the  system  GMM  estimator  yields  a  non-
significant coefficient for years of schooling (column 5). 
The  fact  that  none  of  the  regressions  that  make  use  of  instrumental  variables  produces 
significant estimates for years of schooling suggest that the measurement error problem is not the 
only reason causing insignificant coefficients. Another econometric problem that may be behind 
this result is collinearity between physical capital stocks and years of schooling.  
Figure  1  shows  the  relationship  between  years  of  schooling  (S)  and  the  logarithm  of 
physical capital per worker (k). The correlation between both variables is considerable, as is shown 
by  the  large    obtained  from  an  OLS  regression  of  lnk  on  S  (without  time  dummies).  An 
illustration  that  the  high  collinearity  between  physical  and  human  capital  is  undermining  the 
precision of the estimates can be made by regressing equations (6) and (7) without the physical 
 
4 The original Mincerian equation also includes terms in labour experience and squared labour experience. This is 
explored in section 4. 
5  Note  that  since  estimation  in  .rst-di¤erences  implies  the  lost  of  the  .rst  observation,  the  results  are  not  directly 
comparable to those of column 1. 
6 The standard errors reported for GMM correspond to one-step estimates. Indeed, Blundell and Bond (1998) and 
Blundell et al (2000) show that the two-step standard errors underestimate the true variability of the coe¢ cients, and so 
the lead to under-rejection of non-signi.cant coe¢ cients. See  indmeijer (2000) for a correction of this problem. Human Resources 
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capital variable. The results are shown in panel B of Table 2. There, all the methods of estimation 
except for the difference GMM estimator -result in significant coefficients for S. Even the equation 
in differences, when estimated by OLS, provides a non-null coefficient. Needless to say, these 
results are subject to inconsistency problems due to the omission of physical capital. This is patent 
from the implicit high return on schooling. But the fact that, by omitting physical capital, years of 
schooling become highly significant is a sign that collinearity may be affecting the precision of the 
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So why should collinearity affect more human capital than physical capital? Davidson and 
MacKinnon  (1993,  pp.  181-186)  suggest  a  simple  procedure  to  find  out  the  variable  whose 
significance  is  more  affected  by  the  presence  of  collinearty.  Suppose  that    and    are  two 
collinear regressors and X represents the remaining regressors of the model to be estimated. If an 
OLS regression of   on    and X  produces a higher   than a regression of   on   and X 
then it is the significance of    in the estimated model that will be more affected. The reason is 
that in this case   is relatively well explained by    and X. In the present context, if it is true that 
collinearity is the cause of the low significance of S, a regression of S on lnk and time dummies 
should produce a higher    than a regression of lnk on S and time dummies. The    of these two 
auxiliary regressions (not reported) are respectively 0:72 and 0:70. Although the difference is small 
it is consistent with the fact that physical capital is significant while human capital is not
7 .  
One way to get rid of the collinearity problem is to reparametrize the model. By subtracting 
 from both sides of equation (6) and dividing by   we obtain,  
 
where  The corresponding version in first differences is, 
 
 
7 Obviously this is just a qualitative result. There is no theory that indicates how large the di¤erence between the R2 of 
the auxiliary regressions must be to cause only one of the regressors to lose its signi.cance. So we cannot say that the 
di¤erence found here is "large" or "small". Human Resources 
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The lower scatter in Figure 1 represents the relationship between years of schooling and the 
logarithm of the capital-output ratio. Although the correlation between  and S is still high it 
is lower than correlation between lnk and S.  
This  reparametrization  introduces  additional  endogeneity  problems  as  the  income  level 
appears now in both sides of the equation. Topel (1999) has already estimated equations (8) and (9) 
by constraining the coefficient   to specific values (he chooses 0:35 and 0:5) or by assuming that 
the ratio   is constant for each country over time. Under this last assumption he treats   as a 
country specific effect and estimates (8) and (9) by fixed-effect and OLS methods. 
Table 3 presents unconstrained estimates for the system (8 - 9). The OLS estimation in 
levels (column 1) results in a coefficient r equal to 21:7% and highly significant. This value reflects 
the return on schooling that allows for physical capital to adjust to changes in S so that the ratio 
 stays constant and therefore it can be seen as a long-term return on schooling. The Mincerian-
comparable return of one additional year of schooling .i.e. the increase in income per worker that 
would be obtained without an endogenous response of k.is   This 
figure is still very large. Measurement error problems in both k and y variables may be the cause of 
the implicit low or even negative (column 2) estimates obtained for  . In fact, any measurement 
error affecting y will lead to a spurious negative correlation between ln y and  . Besides, if k 
is also measured with error, OLS methods will yield estimates for   biased towards zero. Note 
however that by dealing with the collinearity problem, the OLS estimation in both levels and in 
first-differences produce positive and significant coefficients associated with schooling. 
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While the GMM estimation in first-differences results in implausible (but non-significant) 
coefficients for both variables, the estimation in levels produces significant coefficients for both the 
capial-output ratio and years of schooling (column 3). The estimated implicit share of physical 
capital in total income (46:4%) is slightly larger than its typical value while the estimated social 
Mincerian return (8%) falls in the  range observed in micro studies. System GMM estimates display 
similar results. The capital share is estimated at   and the semi-elasticity of 
income  with respect to years of schooling is equal to   
These  returns  are  larger  than  those  reported  by  Topel  (1999;  table  2,  column  5)  who, 
conditioning on a physical capital share of 35%, finds a marginal effect of schooling equal to 5.5%. 
On the other hand, the results found here imply that the marginal effect of schooling at a macro 
level is slightly lower than the standard private return observed in labour studies. For instance, from 
around  seventy  country-level  studies,  Psacharopoulos  (1994)  and  Psacharopoulos  and  Patrinos 
(2002)  report  respectively  a  world  average  Mincerian  return  equal  to  10.1%  and  9.7%. 
Consequently,  if  micro  returns  are  taken  at  face  value,  these  results  point  to  an  absence  of 
externalities to schooling
8. 
Alternatively, if an increase in the level of human capital induces an expansion of physical 
capital the total macro return to schooling would be higher than the typical private one. Indeed, 
under the assumption of a constant capital-output ratio the total return to schooling would fall in the 
range  15%-15:5%  depending  on  the  method  of  estimation.  However,  this  larger  long-term 
Mincerian return does not represent externalities in the sense of Lucas (1988). In Lucas.s model, the 
social marginal product of human capital is higher than the private marginal return in the short-run 
.i.e. without taking into consideration any hypothetical endogenous response of physical capital. 
Therefore in order to analyse if these externalities exist in the real world we must compare this 
short-run return with the typical micro Mincerian coefficient. And the results of Table 3 point to the 
absence of this kind of externalities. On the other hand, what Table 3 does show is that, contrary to 
the findings of most of the recent empirical literature, the neoclassical approach to human capital is 
strongly supported by the evidence, and years of schooling present a return surprisingly close to the 
standard value found in micro studies. 
 
            Return Heterogeneity 
 
The previous section assumes, consistently with the earlier literature, that the macro return 
on schooling is constant across countries. However this view has been questionned recently. There 
are theoretical and empircal reasons to believe that the social returns on schooling differ across 
countries. On the theoretical ground, the hypothesis that human capital has decreasing returns with 
the level of schooling has been put forward by Bils and Klenow (2000). Similarly, Hall and Jones 
(1999) and Caselli (2005) assume decreasing Mincerian returns to build human capital stocks for 
income accounting excercices. 
The  decreasing  return  hypothesis  is  in  fact  motivated  by  the  private  Mincerian  returns 
reported  by  Psacharopoulos  (1994)  and  Psacharopoulos  and  Patrinos  (2002).  They  report  wide 
di¤erences across world regions with, on average, richer and better educated countries having lower 
private returns. Note though this is far from being a perfect regularity and there are a number of 
exceptions. For instance, according to Psacharopoulos and Patrinos the latest estimates for Japan 
and Singapore are respectively 13.2% and 13.1% whereas those for South Africa and Egypt are 
respectively 4.1% and 5.5%. Although private and social Mincerian returns are not necessarily 
connected, it is still possible that they are. If so, the observed heterogeneity in labour studies would 
point to important differences in Mincerian returns at the aggregate level. 
 
8 There is a huge literature on whether these micro returns are properly measured but this topic goes far beyond the 
scope of this paper. So the 10.1% result is taken for granted and is used only for comparison with the macro results 
obtained in this paper. Human Resources 
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Other piece of empirical evidence pointing to return heterogeneity is provided by Hanushek 
and Kimko (2000). They show substantial differences in schooling quality across countries, which 
may  also  be  a  cause  of  return  heterogeneity.  Pritchett  (2001)  argues  that  the  low  quality  of 
schooling  is  one  major  cause  of  the  lack  of  signi.cance  of  schooling  variables  in  growth 
regressions
9.  
Under the heterogeneity hypothesis, each country.s long-run return ri can be expressed as: 
 
where   is the world average return and   is the country deviation from the world average. 
It is often stated that heterogeneity is not a problem in itself since the estimated parameter 
can be interpreted as the average across countries, i.e.  . But, this is not necessarily the case. In 
order to assess the effects of return heterogeneity it is convenient to illustrate its consequences for 
cross-section regressions. When the income level is regressed on years of schooling a potential 
source  of  bias  of  the  estimated    emerges  as  the  term    is  present  in  the  residual  of  the 
equation. The sign of the bias introduced by this term depends on whether   and    are positively 
or negatively correlated. According to the micro evidence presented by Psacharopoulos (1994) and 
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) the return on years of schooling is lower in countries with 
higher levels of education, so this would suggest that the correlation   between   and    is 
negative. This, in turn, would imply that methods of estimation that do not account for differences 
in returns across countries produce estimates of   biased downwards. 
On the other hand, it may be the case that higher levels of schooling are not matched by 
higher aggregate productivity, especially in developing countries, as put forward by Pritchett (2001, 
2003). Moreover, Hanushek and Kimko (2000) highlight that schooling quality differs considerably 
among countries and in general it is lower in the poorer and less educated ones. Therefore, since 
more educated countries benefit from higher schooling quality their    should be relatively high. In 
that case   would be positive and the estimated   would be biased upwards. Of course this 
reasoning  neglects  the  endogeneity  of  S  inherent  in  growth  regressions,  which  also  bias  the 
estimated   upwards. Note also that instrumental variable methods do not solve the endogeneity 
problem introduced by return heterogeneity since any instrument that is correlated with    is also 
correlated with   
To assess the effects of heterogeneity in panel regressions let’s decompose country i's years 
of  schooling  into  its  sample  average    and  the  deviation      from  the  average 
. Suppose that the return on schooling is given by (10). Then equation (8) can 
be rewritten as,  
 
Now the source of bias comes from the term    (the term   is part of the country’s 
specific effect). Neglecting other possible sources of bias it can readily be shown that the sign of the 
bias introduced by the presence heterogeneity is equal to the sign of  , where    is country 
i’s variance of years of schooling. Therefore, if countries with lower (higher) than average returns 
have more volatile levels of schooling then   will be estimated with a negative (positive) bias. As 
before, the use of instruments does not solve the bias problem since any variable correlated with   
 
9 Note however that if better quality does have an impact on the return on education then countries with higher levels of 
schooling  (which  are  also  those  with  better  quality)  should  present  higher  returns.  This  is  contradicted  by 
Psacharopoulos.s data. 
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is also correlated with  . Conversely, if there is no correlation between return and volatility of 
education, then return heterogeneity would not bias the estimates of the average world return  : 
The appendix reports the observed    for the countries in the sample. 
A preliminary check of whether the heterogeneity in returns on schooling is biasing the 
estimated  average  return  consists  in  analysing  the  exogeneity  of  instruments  used  in  GMM 
estimation. The Sargan tests of Table 3 reject the hypothesis of endogeneity of the instruments, 
which suggests that heterogeneity is not introducing bias. However the low p-values may be an 
indication that the instruments are in fact not exogenous.  
 
            Micro Returns 
 
An alternative way to deal with heterogeneity is to eliminate the source of bias by explicitly 
accounting for the term   in the regressions. If private returns   and aggregate returns are 
somehow related, the excess private return may be a good proxy for the excess macro return on 
schooling. In the absence of externalities to education   Thus under this assumption 
 would be equal to the excess private return devided by   But even if this extreme case 
does not apply, the private returns may contain some information about the aggregate returns on 
schooling. This suggests the use of micro evidence as a proxy for  . 
We can build the excess private return from the returns reported by Psacharopoulos (1994) 
and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002)
10. The private Mincerian returns obtained in this way are 
reported in the appendix. Note that the number of countries available falls to 55. The variance of 
years  of  schooling  and  the  excess  private  return  of  each  country  are  plotted  in  figure  2.  The 
correlation between both variables is virtually zero. Thus if the excess private returns calculated 
here are a good proxy of the excess social returns, the figure suggests that in panel regressions there 
is no bias in the estimation of   induced by return heterogeneity. 
Table 4 reports the regressions when private returns are used as proxies for social returns. 
The first regression shows the estimation of (11) without accounting for heterogeneity. This is the 
same regression as in table 3 but for the smaller sample of 55 countries for which private Mincerian 
coefficients are available. The results are similar to those obtained with the full sample, although 
the Mincerian return falls to 7.2%. The low Sargan statistic hints at high heterogeneity among the 
countries in this smaller sample. Regression 2 incorporates the excess private return multiplied by 
schooling, which turns out to have a negative and significant coefficient. Recall that the expected 
coefficient on this variable, assuming that private and social returns are equal is  . 
These results show that the data repported by Psacharopoulos are a bad proxy for excess 
social returns. There are are least two possible reasons for this. First, it may be the case that private 
and social returns to education are unrelated, as claimed by Pritchett (2003). This may be caused by 
educational screening and signaling in the labour market, which affects a worker’s salary but not his 
productivity.  An  alternative  explanation  is  that  the  returns  reported  by  Psacharopoulos  are  too 
noisy. An example of this is Jamaica, which has a micro-Mincerian return of 28.8% .or 4.5 standard 
deviations higher than the sample average. This is clearly an outlier that may be having a non 
negligiable effect on the estimates of regression 2. Jaimaca is dropped from the sample in regression 
3. The major effect of this is the lost of significance of the excess private return. This is consistent 
with the fact that the high return of Jamaica is distorting the previous estimates. However, the other 
results are qualitatively the same as in regression 2. Namely, private returns still appear with the 
opposite sign and the Sargan test is too low. Thus, in summary, these results suggest that the excess 
private returns implicit in Psacharopoulos data are in fact a bad proxy for excess social returns. 
 
10 The average of both papers are computed for each country. 
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As an alternative way to exploit the information coming from labour studies, the sample can 
be devided into different groups of countries according to their private returns. This is a natural way 
to proceed if micro and macro returns are correlated. This procedure has, in addition, the advantage 
that it avoids relying too heavily on the numbers reported by Psacharopulos. Regression 4 shows 
the  estimated  macro  returns  for  three  different  groups:  countries  with  low,  moderate  and  high 
private returns. The group with low and moderate private returns display social returns respectively 
equal to 7.8% and 8.3%. These are not statistically different from the observed private returns for 
these groups (respectively 6:3% and 9:5%). By contrast, countries with high private returns have, 
paradoxically, the lowest macro return. It is estimated at 4.9%, which is almost 10 percentage points 
lower than their average private return and non-significant. These results are summarised in table 5. 
Beyond estimation error, there is no obvious reason for these findings. One possible interpretation is 
that  in  countries  where  the  private  return  on  schooling  is  relatively  high  .for  instance,  due  to 
important screening effects -a sub-optimally large share of the population goes to formal education. 
There is some evidence in favour of the screening hypothesis for specific countries as surveyed by 
Riley (2001). But the lack of more systematic evidence prevents exploring further this hypothesis. 
On top of the paucity of evidence, this hypothesis does not say why screening effects are more 
important in some countries than in others. 
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The weighted average social Mincerian return for the three  groups is 7.2% or almost 3 
percentage points lower than the average private return. Supposing that Psacharopulos data properly 
measure the marginal effect of schooling on income, these results point to an absence of positive 
externalities  of  education.  Moreover,  these  .ndings  show  that  there  is  no  obvious  relationship 
between micro and macro returns. More specifically, countries with relatively large micro-returns 
have lower than average macro-retruns.  
Regarding  the  effects  of  heteogeneity  on  the  estimated  average  macro  return,  table  4 
provides mixed evidence. On the one hand, the point estimates that ignore heterogeneity (regression 
1) are identical to those that best acknowledge it (regression 4). This suggests that the heterogeneity 
in social Mincerian returns across countries does not bias the estimated average return obtained 
when heterogenity is ignored. But on the other hand, the low Sargan statistic may be an indication 
that  heterogeneity  is  in  fact  a¤ecting  the  estimates.  Finally,  it  is  important  to  highlight  that 
regardless  of  whether  the  average  return  is  estimated  with  a  bias  or  not,  it  seems  that  return 
heterogeneity across countries is considerable. Thus even a good estimate of the “world” average 
return on schooling may be misleading insofar as the social return in each country really is. 
 
              Quality of Education 
 
One candidate to explain heterogeneity in social Mincerian returns across countries is the 
quality of education. As noted above, Pritchett (2001) justify the lack of significance of schooling in 
cross-country growth regressions by the low quality of education in developing countries. In similar 
regressions Hanushek and Kimko (2000) find that their indicators of education quality have a strong 
explanatory power for growth. As they argue, one possible reason for the implausible large coeffi 
cient on quality that they find is that quality determines the long-run income level.  
To assess the effect of quality    on income levels we first compute the simple average of 
the two quality scores reported by Hanushek and Kimko (2000, pp. 1206-1207) for each country 
available. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results the measure of quality is scaled to 1 
for the country with the highest score in the sample (Singapore). The    values obtained in this way 
are shown in the appendix. Then we can estimate the effect of quality by multiplying    by the 
number of years of schooling. This approach assumes that quality and quantity can be substituted by 
each other. On the other hand, multiplying the quality indicator by years of schooling captures the 
notion that the productivity of schooling increases with quality. This is a departure from Hanushek 
and Kimko who assume that the impact of schooling on  growth is independent of quality. Under 
this approach the equation to be estimated is, Human Resources 
  58 
 
where   is a measure of the weight of quality in the determination of the return on schooling.  
Table 6 presents the main effects of quality of education for different values for   . The 
first regression is the baseline estimation with the smaller sample of 67 countries for which the data 
on education quality and years of schooling is available. In this regression years of schooling is not 
weighted by quality (or equivalently  = 0). There are no important differences with respect to the 
full-sample  regression  (see  regression  5  of  table  3).  Namely,  the  point  estimate  for  the  social 
Mincerian return is virtually the same as before (8.4%). In regression 2, where   = 1, the quality-
weighted  level  of  schooling  enters  with  a  larger  and  highly  significant  coefficient.  The  social 
Mincerian  return  implied  in  regression  2  for  a  country  with  q  =  1  is 
 Thus the sample average Mincerean return is simply 0.1 times 
the average quality across countries. The resulting return is 6.6%, which implies that neglecting 
education  quality  yields  a  return  biased  upwards  by  1.8  points  in  this  particular  specification. 
Regressions 3 and 4 report the results for larger values of   As expected, the world average 
Mincerian return decreases as the importance of quality is assumed to increase. 
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We can measure the difference between the social returns in table 6 and the private returns 
reported by Psacharopoulos in order to obtain a crude assessment of the externality to education in 
each country. The implicit externalites assuming   = 1 are shown in the appendix. In general, the 
high private returns observed in some countries are not accompanied by equivalently large social 
returns.  This  is  so  because,  in  general  but  not  always,  countries  with  high  private  retrurns  on 
education have relatively low levels of quality (figure 2). This imples a low social return in these 
countries under the especification that we have assumed. The sample average of the macro Mincer 
coefficient is 3 percentage points lower than the private return.  
One problem about the regressions 1-4 is that education quality is assumed to affect in a too 
specific way the return on schooling. Instead of multiplying quality by years of schooling a more 
parsimonious representation may be obtained by splitting the sample of countries according to their 
quality  levels.  Then  a  separate  estimate  can  be  obtained  for  each  group  of  countries.  Such 
estimation has the advantage that it does not need to specify how quality affects the return on 
schooling. But on the other hand, this approach has problems of its own since it supposes that all 
the countries in a group have the same return. Ignoring this last caveat, regression 5 shows the 
estimates when countries are split into three quality groups
11. Countries in the low quality group 
have  a  low  and  non-significant  coefficient  on  schooling.  On  the  other  hand  countries  with 
“moderate” and “high” quality have a significant coefficient on years of schooling. The implicit 
Mincerian returns for these countries are respectively 8.7% and 9.8%. However these are likely to 
be upper bounds since the share of physical capital is implausibly low in this regression. Note also 
that the Sargan statistic increases significantly, which may be an indication that regression 5 is 
dealing  better  with  heterogeneity  than  regressions  1-4.  Finally,  regression  6  groups  together 
countries with moderate and high quality of education. The coefficient on the   ratio is now 
significant at a 10% level and the implicit share of physical capital raises to 39%. This causes the 
Mincerian return of countries with better quality to fall to 7.5%. But the coefficient on schooling is 
still highly significant. By contrast, the return for countries with low quality is 1.5% and is not 
significally different from zero.  
To summarise these findings, schooling quality appears an important determinant of the 
social return on schooling. The results of table 6 show that ignoring quality of schooling leads to an 
overestimation  of  the  average  macro  Mincer  coefficient.  The  magnitude  of  this  overestimation 
depends on how quality enters in the regressions. According to the regression 6, which yielded the 




This paper has revisited the .ndings of earlier empirical studies on schooling and income, a 
literature that has failed to find a role for schooling as an input in a standard production function. 
One  particular  issue  that  undermines  the  estimates  of  the  coefficient  on  schooling  in  panel 
regressions is the collinearity between years of schooling and physical capital stocks. It is shown 
that when problems of model specification are properly dealt with, years of schooling fit well in a 
neoclassical production function. In the borderline panel regression for 83 countries the coefficient 
on schooling is highly significant and the point estimate for the macro Mincer return is 8.3%. This 
coefficient must not be interpreted as a internal rate of return of schooling but as the causal effect of 
schooling on income per worker. With this caveat in mind the estimates suggest the absence of 
externalities to education, which is consistent with the findings based on wage regressions as in 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) or Ciconne and Peri (2005). 
 
11The groups are formed by countries with quality lower than 0:45 (14 countries), between 0:45 and 0:67 (19 countries) 
and larger than 0:67 (34 countries). These thresholds were determined by the ocurrence of important di¤erences in 
quality levels between two consecutive countries (when ranked by quality). This seems more reasonable and produced 
more sensible results than the option of having groups with the same number of countries.  Human Resources 
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This  number  is  an  estimate  of  the  cross-country  average  macro  return  on  schooling. 
However  there  seems  to  be  substantial  return  heterogeneity  across  countries.  Paradoxically, 
countries where the micro Mincer coefficients are relatively high display on average a low and non 
significant macro return. The other countries in the sample show social returns in line with the 
private ones. One possible explanation for this is that screening effects are pushing up the private 
returns on schooling in some countries. If the education premium is high due to screening, then 
workers with low ability will be encouraged to invest in formal education. In this case high private 
returns on education may be accompanied with low macro Mincer coefficients. Labour studies, 
however, have not produced robust evidence about these kind of e¤ects.  
Paralleling  these  findings,  schooling  quality  appears  as  a  significant  determinant  of 
disparities in the social return of schooling across countries. When quality is taken into acccount, 
the estimated return on schooling depends on how the quality score enters in the regressions. For 
instance, when it multiplies the number of years of schooling the average social return falls to 6.6%. 
Under this setup the country with the highest quality in the sample (Singapur) has a social return on 
schooling equal to 10%, whereas in the country with the lowest quality (Iran) the macro Mincer 
coefficient  is  only  3%.  If  instead  of  explicitily  including  the  quality  score  in  the  regressions, 
countries are grouped according to their quality lelvels and a separate return is estimated for each 
group,  similar  results  emerge.  More  specifically,  the  return  in  a  group  of  countries  with  low 
schooling quality is virtually equal to zero. In countries with moderate and high levels of quality the 
average return is 7.5%. The average return for all three groups of counties obtained in this way is 
6.2%. 
The previous results show that when return heterogeneity is not taken into account in these 
regresssions, the average Micerian return is estimated with a positive bias of about 2 percentage 
points.  Another  implication  of  heterogeneity  is  that  income  accounting  excercices  that  assume 
similar Mincerian returns may be seriously understimating the role of human capital in explaining 
income di¤erences across countries. 
This leads us to the question of what allows countries to improve schooling attainment. 
Most empirical studies try to .nd out what the income elasticity to schooling is. But this provides 
precious little guidance on the policies that may lead to higher levels of schooling. One interesting 
line of  research is the role of health  and life expectancy  in the private decisions on schooling 
investment. In this respect, the theoretical works of Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro (2001) 
and of Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder and Weil (2000), where increases in life expectancy raise investment 
in human capital are an important step ahead. Complementary empirical studies on this field would 
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